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COPYRIGHT STATUTES THAT REGULATE
TECHNOLOGY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE
AUDIO HOME RECORDING ACT AND THE DIGITAL
MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
Benton J. Gaffney
Abstract: Over the past two decades, as the presence of digital technology has become
more and more ubiquitous, its tremendous capabilities of reproduction and distribution have
created difficult issues for copyright law. Recently, Congress has addressed some of these
issues by taking the nontraditional approach of directly regulating the manufacture,
development, and distribution of technology. In 1992, Congress enacted the Audio Home
Recording Act, requiring that all digital audio recording devices possess a serial copy
management system to limit the copying of digital music recordings. Six years later, Congress
passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, making it a crime to manufacture or distribute
technologies for the purpose of circumventing technological measures taken by copyright
owners to protect their copyrights. This Comment examines copyright regulation of
technology by analyzing the relative merits of these two statutes vis-i-vis the broader goals of
copyright law. It concludes that copyright statutes can best regulate technology if they
designate a specific copyright protection system, require technology manufacturers to
incorporate the protection system into their products, and identify a rlemaking body to
maintain the statutes' effectiveness.
Within the last decade, Congress has enacted two important statutes
that take the nontraditional approach of regulating technology to further
the objectives of copyright policy. The Audio Home Recording Act of
1992 (AHRA)' regulates technology by requiring that all digital audio
recording devices possess a serial copy management system to prevent
the device from making copies of an already copied digital audio
recording.' The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA)3
regulates technology by prohibiting the manufacture and distribution of
technologies designed or marketed for purposes of circumventing a
technological measure that seeks to protect a copyrighted work.4
From a copyright policy perspective, each of these statutes responds to
the concern that the capabilities of digital technology may significantly
exacerbate the problems of copyright piracy. These fears of copyright
piracy stem from two key aspects of digital technology: ease of copying
1. Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (1992) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1994)).
2. See 17 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (1994).
3. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified, in relevant part, at 17 U.S.C. § 1201
(Supp. IV 1999)).
4. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b)(1) (Supp. IV 1999).
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and ease of distribution. Digital technology allows copyrighted works in
a digital format to be copied perfectly, easily, and cheaply. Transmitting
digital works over the Internet or other telecommunications networks
similarly facilitates simple and cost-effective distribution. While
beneficial in many ways, the advances of digital technology threaten to
make it difficult for copyright owners to prevent piracy by bringing
lawsuits against infringers, the traditional method of protecting
ownership rights.
Although both the DMCA and AHRA seek to resolve these piracy
concerns in a new fashion, neither is a complete solution, and certain
aspects of each may even create new problems. For example, new
technologies falling outside the scope of the AHRA may raise the same
piracy concerns the AHRA was intended to address.5 One shortcoming of
the DMCA is that its anticircumvention provisions do little to prevent
piracy of the vast majority of works already available in an unprotected
digital format.6 Another problem is that, by giving owners free rein to
develop any protection measure they choose and making it a potential
crime to distribute technologies that would bypass such measures, the
DMCA provides copyright owners with an incentive to increase
technological control of their works beyond the scope of traditional
copyright protection.' Furthermore, the strict penalties under the DMCA,
combined with powerful protective systems, may prevent individuals
from using protected works in ways traditionally encouraged under
copyright law.'
This Comment examines the strengths and weaknesses of the DMCA
and AHRA as copyright statutes that regulate technology. Part I provides
an overview of copyright law and the policy objectives it seeks to
accomplish. Part II highlights the improvements of digital technology
over earlier technologies, the piracy implications of digital technology,
and the key technologies of digital copyright protection systems. Part III
describes the mechanics of the AHRA and DMCA and the means by
which they regulate technology. Part IV identifies the advantages of
regulating technologies over the traditional method of regulating uses in
the context of digital works. Part V argues that both the AHRA and
DMCA have substantial shortcomings. Finally, Part VI proposes that to
5. See infra Part V.A.
6. See infra Part V.B.
7. See infra Part V.B.
8. See infra Part V.B.
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resolve these problems Congress should capitalize on the alternative
strengths of the AHRA and DMCA by specifying in the statute the
copyright protection system that manufacturers should incorporate into
their products and designating a rulemaking body to maintain the
statutes' effectiveness in the face of technological change.
I. THE FRAMEWORK OF COPYRIGHT LAW
Copyright law attempts to balance the interests of authors and the
public by granting certain exclusive rights to authors but limiting these
rights both in scope and duration. It has existed in American
jurisprudence at least since the writing of the Constitution.9 Although the
immediate effect of copyright protection is "to secure a fair return for an
'author's' creative labor," the ultimate goal is "to stimulate artistic
creativity for the general public good."' ° A major ongoing challenge for
both courts and legislators is how to maintain this balance in the face of
rapid technological change.
The 1976 Copyright Act"' (Act) exemplifies Congress's attempt to
strike a balance between private and public interests. It originally granted
copyright owners five exclusive rights" concerning their works: the
rights of reproduction, adaptation, distribution, performance, and
display. 3 Authors can bring an infringement action against anyone who
violates the exclusive nature of these rights by using the copyrighted
work without authorization in a way proscribed by the statute. 4 The
consequences of infringement can be severe both in terms of monetary
damages" and criminal penalties.' 6 The intended goal of granting
9. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("Congress shall ... Promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries....").
10. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
11. Pub. L. No. 94-533, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010
(1994)).
12. In 1995, the Digital Performance Rightin Sound Recordings Act added the right to perform
sound recordings by digital transmission as a sixth exclusive right. See Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat.
336 (1995) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (Supp. II 1997)).
13. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
14. See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1994).
15. Successful plaintiffs can choose between predetermined statutory damages that range from
$200 to $100,000 or a sum equal to the actual loss and/or unjust enrichment that results from the
defendant's infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)-(c) (1994).
16. Willful infringers may face criminal sanctions. See 17 U.S.C. § 506 (1994).
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copyright owners this "bundle of rights" is to provide a strong incentive
for authors to create new works and make those works available to the
public. 7 To benefit the public interest, the Act also restricts the copyright
owners' exclusive rights.'" For example, the Act limits the duration of
copyright protection 9 and the scope of owners' rights through the
doctrines of fair use20 and first sale.2 ' Thus, copyright law balances
giving owners a limited monopoly over their works by circumscribing
their rights in specific ways to enhance the use and availability of
copyrighted works for the public good.
Since the enactment of the Act, however, new technologies have
repeatedly upset this balance.22 Some technologies, such as photocopying
and videotaping, have facilitated the infringement of authors' rights.'
Others, such as compact discs and encryption, have enabled authors to
control the use of their works more tightly.24 Both types of innovation
17. Although this economic-incentive model predominates in the United States, see Twentieth
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975), other rationales justifying authors' rights
to control their intellectual property also exist in international, particularly European, copyright law.
See Marshall Leaffer, Understanding Copyright Law 16-18 (3d ed. 1999). For example, according
to the Lockean theory of property, effort expended by authors in creating their work entitles them to
rights over the fruits of their labor. See id.
18. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-120 (1994); see also 17 U.S.C. § 121 (Supp. IV 1999).
19. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (Supp. IV 1999) (limiting duration of copyrights to life of author plus 70
years).
20. The fair use doctrine balances public interest with the interests of the author by allowing a
defense for certain uses that would otherwise infringe on the author's exclusive rights. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 107. To evaluate whether a use is "fair," courts weigh the following four factors: (1) the character
of the use (commercial uses are less fair); (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount of
the work that was used (using more of the work is less fair); and (4) the effect of the use on the
market for the work (a more commercially harmful use is less fair). See Sony Corp. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447-55 (1984); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471
U.S. 539, 560-69 (1985). In addition, certain types of uses also fall into the category of fair use,
such as parody, criticism, news reporting, or education. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994).
21. The first sale doctrine limits the scope of the author's rights by precluding authors from
restricting the distribution of a copy once it has been sold. See 17 U.S.C. § 109.
22. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 430 ("From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in
response to significant changes in technology.").
23. Both of these technologies allowed for easy duplication of copyrighted works, thus creating
substantial controversy in copyright law. See id. at 420 (videotaping); Williams & Wilkins Co. v.
United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1347 (1973) (photocopying), aff'd by an equally divided court, 420
U.S. 376 (1975).
24. For many years, the high cost of "burning" (copying) new compact discs lowered the risk of
piracy in this medium. See Jeanmarie Lovoi, Note, Competing Interests: Anti-Piracy Efforts
Triumph Under TRIPS but New Copying Technology Undermines the Success, 25 Brook. J. Int'l L.
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have the potential for derailing copyright law's overall goal of
maximizing the existence and availability of creative works.
As a particular technology makes this potential for imbalance more
apparent, Congress generally responds by enacting new legislation to
address the problems created by the new technology.' Most recently, the
advent of digital technology has greatly affected copyright policy,
resulting in a variety of legislative responses.26 Before describing two
such statutes, it is necessary to provide some background regarding
digital technology, its advantages, the piracy concerns it raises, and the
issue of copyright control.
II. DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY
A. Advantages ofDigital Technology over Earlier Technologies
Digital technology and its effect on copyright law can be best
understood by comparing it to the analog technologies that preceded it.
The distinguishing feature between digital and analog technologies is
that analog formats simulate the original work directly while digital
formats replicate the original work by translating it into a language of
ones and zeros.27 Books, vinyl records, audiocassettes, and posters are
examples of common analog formats, while compact discs, computer
hard drives, and digital video discs (DVD) are examples of digital
formats. 2
445, 475-76 (1999). The recent advent of low-cost compact-disc burners, however, may have
opened this medium to piracy. See id
25. Numerous examples of this phenomenon exist, including the Sound Recording Act of 1971,
Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (1994)) (addressing
concerns that advances in music taping were increasing music piracy), and the Record Rental
Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 109(b), 1 15(c)(3)
(1994)) (addressing concerns that renting compact discs would promote illicit copying).
26. While this Comment discusses only two such statutes, the AHRA and DMCA, other statutes
have also been enacted to address digital technology and copyright law. See, e.g., The Digital Right
in Sound Performance Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (codified in scattered sections
of 17 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1999)).
27. For example, Thomas Edison's original phonograph was an analog device that replicated
sounds by translating the airwaves created by a sound into directly analogous grooves on paraffined
paper. See 17 The New Encyclopedia Britannica 1050-51 (15th ed. 1998). Modem digital devices
that produce sounds do not directly replicate the original sounds; instead, they translate the sounds
into ones and zeros that can be converted back into sounds when later read by a digital device. See
27 The New Encyclopedia Britannica 625-26 (15th ed. 1998).
28. See Andrew S. Muroff, Comment, Some Rights Reserved: Music Copyright in the Digital Era,
1997 Det. C.L. Rev. 1241, 1270.
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The competitive advantages of digital over analog technology are
numerous. First, the integrity of digital copies is superior to analog ones.
Because no technology yet allows the making of exact physical replicas,
the slight variations that result each time a work is copied mean that
analog works degrade in quality with each successive generation of
copies.29 In contrast, when digital copies are made, even if small physical
differences between the original and the copy exist, the copied digital
sequence of ones and zeros usually remains the same despite these
differences." Thus, a digital copy usually retains the same quality and
precision as the original with no degradation in future generations of
copies.3
Second, media that store digital information are usually less costly
than their analog equivalents. For instance, it is cheaper to manufacture
the plastic disc that makes up a DVD than the plastic box and reel of
magnetic tape that makes up a videocassette.32 Similarly, it is cheaper to
store a 100-page essay on a floppy computer disk than on actual paper. In
short, digital technology reduces costs by storing more information in a
smaller space and putting the information into media that are cheaper to
manufacture.
A third advantage of digital technology is that it facilitates interactive
systems and the transmission of digital works. While analog modes of
transmission, such as radio broadcasting, telephone, facsimile, and
television, are widespread, they lack a critical feature of digital
technology: interactivity. An interactive system is one in which an
individual can contact a sender and receive a transmission of specific
information on demand.33 While analog technology allows a certain level
of interactivity, it is far more cumbersome than digital technology. For
example, although a listener can request that a radio station play a
specific song through the analog medium of a telephone call, this
29. For instance, if a page from a book is photocopied and copies are made from each successive
new copy, the quality of each new copy will be inferior to its predecessor.
30. However, anyone who has ever had a corrupted computer file will know that digital copying
is not always perfect. Nonetheless, relative to analog copying, digital copying duplicates the original
work with much greater accuracy and precision. See Muroff, supra note 28, at 1270.
31. See id.
32. See Terry Pristin, DVD Killed Video's Star; A Digital Step in Making the VCR Obsolete, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 7, 2000, at C1.
33. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(4) (Supp. III 1997) (defining one form of interactive system,
interactive services, as service "that enables a member of the public to receive a transmission of a
program specially created for the recipient, or on request, ... which is selected by or on behalf of the
recipient").
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requires more effort than simply clicking on the song at the radio
station's web site and digitally downloading the song. Digital technology
greatly facilitates interactivity because it allows instructions to be sent in
a digital form. This makes it possible to have highly automated systems,
such as computer networks, that can receive and read instructions and
then send particular digital works to the individual making the request.34
In contrast, analog systems lack a universal language similar to the ones
and zeros of digital systems that would make complex functions more
feasible in an analog setting.
The advantages of transmitting information digitally are enhanced by
the Internet.35 One of the most important technological innovations of the
1990s has been the transformation of the Internet from a network system
used primarily by universities and government entities to the "infor-
mation superhighway" accessed by tens of millions of users worldwide
each day. 6 This has dramatically increased the average person's ability
to transfer enormous quantities of digital information to almost anywhere
in the world.
B. Copyright Piracy Implications ofDigital Technology
Digital technology's many advantages can also facilitate copyright
piracy, thus intensifying the concerns Congress faced with earlier
technologies. For instance, while both analog and digital taping facilitate
piracy by allowing for easy reproduction, digital copying exacerbates this
problem because unlike analog copies, digital copies do not degrade in
quality with subsequent generations of copies. Media for storing digital
information, such as compact discs, floppy disks, or DVDs, also benefit
pirating enterprises because these media are generally less expensive to
manufacture and store than their analog equivalents of paper, records, or
cassettes.37 In addition, the ease with which digitized works can be
distributed over the Internet or other telecommunications networks raises
issues analogous to those presented by the advent of radio and television
34. Downloading digital works from the Internet is an example of sending such instructions
through a digital interactive system.
35. See generally Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849-53 (1997) (providing excellent description
and explanation of Internet).
36. Seeki
37. See Pristin, supra note 32, at Cl.
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broadcasting. 8 Yet, unlike those earlier technologies, the confluence of
digitization and new telecommunication capabilities39 gives the public an
interactive' means of obtaining copyrighted works on demand. Finally,
the combination of digital technology and the Internet exacerbates many
of the problems of international copyright piracy. Previously, works
pirated abroad reached American markets primarily by being physically
smuggled into the country." Because international borders do not restrict
the Internet, it is now possible for pirated digital works to reach
American markets by purely electronic means.42
C. Protection of Copyrights in Digital Form
While digital technology may facilitate piracy, "copyright manage-
ment systems"'43 (CMS) have the potential to control tightly the uses of a
digital work." For example, CMS may restrict users from rendering,
copying, or transferring a work unless they pay a fee to the copyright
owner.45 Alternatively, CMS may allow users to view a work but prohibit
any copying or excerpting of the work.46 These systems also vary greatly
38. Because radio and television provide widespread distribution of copyrighted works to the
public, they initially presented issues such as how to broadcast copyrighted works in a way that
adequately compensated owners (for example, by imposing compulsory licenses on the broadcast of
musical works by radio stations under 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1994)) and which uses of the broadcasted
works by consumers are permissible (for example, consumers' rights to videotape television
broadcasts, such as in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)).
39. Such telecommunications capabilities include not only the Internet, but also satellite networks,
cellular or "wireless" networks, and digital cable.
40. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., Lovoi, supra note 24, at 469-70.
42. See Barak D. Jolish, Scuttling the Music Pirate: Protecting Recordings in the Age of the
Internet, 17 SPG Ent. & Sports L. 9,9-10 (1999).
43. CMS are "technologies that enable copyright owners to regulate reliably and automatically for
access to digital works." Julie E. Cohen, Some Reflections on Copyright Management Systems and
Laws Designed to Protect Them, 12 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 161, 161 (1997). As used in this Comment,
the term CMS encompasses similar ideas such as "copyright protection systems," "automated rights
management," and "trusted systems." See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. IV 1999) ("copyright
protection systems"); Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights
Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 557 (1998) ("automated rights
management"); Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible: How Trusted Systems and Digital Property
Rights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Publishing, 12 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 137 (1997) ("trusted
systems").
44. See Mark Stefik & Alex Silverman, The Bit and the Pendulum: Balancing the Interests of
Stakeholders in Digital Publishing, Computer Law., Jan. 1999, at 1, 4.
45. See Cohen, supra note 43, at 162.
46. See id.
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in terms of sophistication, security protection, and versatility. At one end
of the spectrum are CMS that require a simple password to access digital
information and do not prevent subsequent copying or distribution of the
information.47 More sophisticated systems, however, can manage many
future uses of a digital work long after it has been obtained from the
copyright owner.48
Although a detailed explanation of various CMS is beyond the scope
of this Comment, two examples of CMS are encryption and digital
watermarking. Encryption simply refers to the process of encoding or
scrambling digital information so that it is only readable to those who
have the necessary tools' to decrypt it.49 Digital watermarking is the
process whereby digital information is made part of the actual work (for
instance, by minutely altering the sounds of a digital sound recording) in
a way that is not humanly discernible, but rather, capable of being
perceived by watermark-reading devices or software. 0 The two primary
uses of digital watermarking are to identify copyrighted works by
providing identifying information in the watermarks and to control use of
the work by placing instructions in the watermark that limit the uses a
device may make of the work.5 Both digital watermarking and
encryption have different levels of sophistication and each may be used
in conjunction with the other as part of a particular CMS.
I. COPYRIGHT LEGISLATION REGULATING TECHNOLOGY
Because digital technologies present such a "unique threat" to the
balance of copyright interests,52 Congress has twice decided to regulate
these technologies directly instead of reconfiguring copyright owners'
rights. These laws represent a departure from Congress's historical
approach of regulating only the uses of a copyrighted work, usually
47. See Margaret Jane Radin & Daniel L. Appelman, Doing Business in the Digital Era: Some
Basic Issues, 570 PLI/Pat. 51, 56 (1999).
48. See Stefik & Silverman, supra note 44, at 4.
49. See Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the
"Newtonian" World of On-line Commerce, 12 Berkeley Tech. LJ. 115, 117 (1997) (describing
encryption and depicting its primary limitation as "guard[ing] only one link of a potentially very
long commercial chain: the original exchange between seller and buyer").
50. See Rosemarie F. Jones, Comment, Wet Foopints? Digital Watermarks: A Trail to the
Copyright Infilnger on the Internet, 26 Pepp. L. Rev. 559, 568-70 (1999).
51. See Jolish, supra note 42, at 11.
52. K Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 25 (1998).
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through the expansion or limitation of copyright owners' exclusive rights
to their works. 3 Two copyright statutes that directly regulate digital
technologies are the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA) 54 and
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA)" While some
overlap exists between these statutes,56 they differ in the manner in which
they regulate technology, the purposes for which they were enacted, and
the types of technologies they regulate.
A. The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992
The AHRA resulted from a compromise between the music-recording
and electronics industries over the manufacture of digital audio tape
(DAT) players. 7 The AHRA has three essential parts: a copying control
system," a royalty scheme,59 and a prohibition against infringement suits
for noncommercial uses of music recordings.' Although this section
discusses all three components, the focus is on the copying control
system of the AHRA. The scope of the AHRA will also be addressed in
the context of a recent Ninth Circuit case that examined the AHRA's
applicability to computers and related devices.
53. See id. at 24; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. HI 1997) (providing copyright owners exclusive
rights); 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-120 (1994) (providing limitations on exclusive rights); 17 U.S.C. § 121
(Supp. IV 1999) (same).
54. Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (1992) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1994)).
55. Pub. L. No 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified, in relevant part, at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-
1205 (Supp. IV 1999)).
56. For instance, similar to the DMCA's anticircumvention provisions, the AHRA contains a
provision prohibiting the circumvention of the serial copy management system. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 1002(c) (1994).
57. DAT technology raised music industry concerns because it enabled cost-effective "perfect"
copying that would promote piracy and erode the market for commercial music recordings. See H.
Rep. No. 102-873, pt. 2, at 2 (1992). After prolonged negotiations and the filing of a suit by the
music industry against Sony Corp., see Cahn v. Sony Corp., 90 Civ. 4537 (S.D.N.Y filed July 1990),
the electronics and music industries agreed on a solution that formed the basis of the AHRA. See S.
Rep. No. 102-294, at 32-33 (1992).
58. See 17 U.S.C. § 1002 (1994).
59. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1003-1007 (1994).
60. See 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (1994).
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1. Technology Controls of the AHRA: The Serial Copy Management
System
The AHRA regulates technology by requiring that all "digital audio
recording devices"61 or "digital audio interface devices ' possess the
Serial Copy Management System (SCMS) or its functional equivalent.63
The SCMS is a system that allows unlimited copies to be made from
lawfully purchased music recordings but prevents making copies from
copies.' It functions by encoding a digital "flag" at the beginning of the
work that tells the device whether a copy can be made of the recording.6'
A device equipped with an SCMS will copy only digital sound
recordings that are "flagged" with the proper code indicating that a copy
may be made.' When the SCMS-equipped device makes a copy, it
changes the encoded information to indicate that no future copies can be
made from the copied recording.67 Congress included several provisions
designed to maintain the efficacy of the SCMS by prohibiting both the
manufacture or distribution of devices designed to circumvent the
SCMS' and the encoding of false or inaccurate SCMS information on
digital music recordings.69
One effect of the SCMS requirement is that it limits the degree to
which private sharing can affect the market for commercial music and
sound recordings. Even though commercial pirates can still make
unlimited copies from a single original and sell those to the public, 0 the
SCMS mitigates the extent to which copies can spread among private
61. 17 U.S.C. § 1001(3) (1994) (defining "digital audio recording device" as "any machine or
device of a type commonly distributed to individuals .... the digital recording function of which is
designed or marketed for the primary purpose of... making a digital audio copied recording for
private use").
62. 17 U.S.C. § 1001(2) (1994) (defining "digital audio interface device" as device that acts as
conduit for digital audio information going to digital audio recording device).
63. See 17 U.S.C. § 1002(a). The exact SCMS requirements are presented in the Technical
Reference Document for the Audio Home Recording Act of 1991. See S. Rep. No. 102-294, at 17
(1992).
64. See S. Rep. No. 102-294, at 36 (describing how SMCS functions).
65. See a at 37.
66. See a
67. See idt
68. See 17 U.S.C. §-1002(c) (1994).
69. See 17 U.S.C. § 1002(d) (1994).
70. See Lovoi, supra note 24, at 480 (describing how piracy operations have continued despite
presence of SMCS controls in new "compact disc-recordable" devices).
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individuals. For instance, if a digital music recording purchaser makes a
copy for a friend, the SCMS prevents the friend from making copies for
other friends, who could then make copies for their friends, and so on.
Between these two types of unauthorized copying, commercial piracy
and private sharing, the latter is far more difficult to prevent.7'
The SCMS requirement is complemented by the AHRA's other two
elements: the royalty scheme and the noncommercial-use immunity
provision. Because the SCMS still allows significant amounts of copying
to occur, the music industry felt that the SCMS alone would inadequately
compensate for the unauthorized private copying.72 At the same time,
consumers and the electronics industry remained concerned that private
copying could give rise to an action for infringement or contributory
infringement.73 The resulting compromise created a royalty system
whereby royalties are levied on sales of digital audio recording devices
and the media onto which they record, with the proceeds to be distributed
to copyright owners of audio recordings.74 The concerns of consumers
and the electronics industry also were mollified by prohibiting copyright
infringement actions based on the manufacture, importation, or
distribution of digital audio recording devices or on the noncommercial
use of digital or analog music recordings.75
2. Defining the Scope of the AHRA: Recording Industry Ass'n of
America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc.
The scope of the AHRA is critical to how it functions. Although the
statutory language of the AHRA describes the SCMS and royalty system
as applying to "digital audio recording device[s],"76 the statutory
definition of this phrase does not cover all devices that can record digital
71. While commercial piracy is certainly a threat to copyright owners, large-scale decentralized
copying by private individuals may be a much greater threat because it is harder to detect, deter, and
obtain remunerative remedies. See infra Part IV.B.
72. See S. Rep. No. 102-294, at 38-39 (describing need for royalty system).
73. See id. at 38.
74. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1003-1004 (1994) (describing how royalties are indirectly collected in form
of two-percent tax on sales of digital audio recording devices and three-percent tax on sales of digital
audio recording media); see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 1006-1007 (1994); Muroff, supra note 28, at 1252
n.82 (detailing breakdown of royalty distributions under § 1006).
75. See 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (1994).
76. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1002(a), 1003(a) (1994).
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sounds.77 The recent case of Recording Industry Ass'n of America v.
Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc.78 dealt with this issue at length and
provided a thorough analysis for determining whether a device is
regulated by the AHRA.
In Diamond, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA)79
sought an injunction against the manufacture and sale of a device called
the Rio PMP 300 (Rio) that would allow listeners to copy MP3 0 music
files from their computers onto portable "walkman" style MP3 players."
The RIAA feared that the Rio would encourage piracy because a major
source of MP3 music files is Internet sites that promote downloading
pirated MP3 versions of copyrighted songs.8 2 The RAA argued that an
injunction was proper because the Rio was a digital audio recording
device that lacked an SCMS and therefore violated the AHRA.83 The
district court denied the RIAA's request for an injunction, finding that
although the Rio was a digital recording device under the AHRA, its lack
of a digital output capability made it impossible to copy music serially
from a Rio to another device.' The court concluded that an injunction
was unnecessary because "incorporating [an] SCMS into the Rio appears
an exercise in futility" and "the Rio adequately 'prohibit[s] unauthorized
serial copying."' 85 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit did not reach the
question of whether the Rio met the SCMS requirements of the AHRA
because it found that the Rio was not a "digital audio recording device"
77. See 17 U.S.C. § 1001(3) (1994).
78. 180 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 1999).
79. The RIAA represents "the roughly half-dozen major record companies (and the artists on their
labels) that control approximately ninety percent of the distribution of recorded music in the United
States." I:d at 1074
80. MP3 (Motion Picture Experts Group, Audio Layer 3) is a format that compresses the digital
sound data in a sound file to one-tenth its original size with very little degradation in sound quality.
See Jennifer E. Markiewicz, Comment, Seeking Shelter From the MP3 Storm: How Far Does the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act Online Service Provider Liability Limitation Reach?, 7
CommLaw Conspectus 423, 439-40 (1999). This allows for much easier transfer and storage of
digital music files.
81. See Diamond, 180 F.3d at 1074-75.
82. See id at 1073.
83. See id at 1075.
84. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 624,
632 (C.D. Cal. 1998), affd, 180 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 1999).
85. Id
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within the meaning of the AHRA.86 The Ninth Circuit based its decision
on the language, legislative history, and policy of the AHRA"
The Ninth Circuit began by analyzing the language of the AHRA.8
The AHRA defines "digital audio recording device" as a device that can
make a "digital audio copied recording,"89 the definition of which is a
copied "digital musical recording." 9 However, digital audio recording
devices are only those devices distributed for individual use (private or
nonprofessional) and whose primary purpose is to make digital audio
copied recordings.9 The AHRA expressly excludes from its definition of
"digital musical recording" any "material object . . . in which one or
more computer programs are fixed."'92 Because a Rio relies on a
computer to supply it with MP3 songs,93 the court concluded that songs
played on a Rio could not constitute "digital musical recordings" because
the hard drive from which the songs were copied was almost certainly a
material object with computer programs fixed on it.94 The Ninth Circuit
also rejected the district court's finding that Congress did not intend
computers to have such a broad exemption from the AHRA, because "the
Act seems to have been expressly designed to create this loophole."95
In addition, the Ninth Circuit's holding rested on the legislative
history and policy behind the AHRA. In explaining what types of devices
have the primary purpose of making digital audio copied recordings, the
Senate Report on the AHRA states that "the typical personal computer
would not fall within the definition of 'digital audio recording device.' 96
The court relied on this statement to support its conclusion that the
multifunction nature of computers excluded them and devices dependent
on them-like the Rio-from the AHRA. 97 Finally, the court reasoned
that "the Rio's operation is entirely consistent with the Act's main
86. See Diamond, 180 F.3d at 1081.
87. See id. at 1076-81.
88. See id. at 1075.
89. 17 U.S.C. § 1001(3) (1994).
90. 17 U.S.C. § 1001(1) (1994).
91. See 17 U.S.C. § 1001(3).
92. 17 U.S.C. § 1001(5)(B) (1994).
93. See Diamond, 180 F.3d at 1076.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 1078.
96. Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 102-294, at *122 (1992)).
97. See id.
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purpose-the facilitation of personal use.""8 More specifically, the court
determined that the Rio's ability to "space-shift" MP3 files that already
existed on the user's hard drive was a "paradigmatic noncommercial
personal use entirely consistent with the purposes of the Act.""
B. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
The second copyright statute directly regulating digital technology is
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DCMA).'" Unlike the AHRA,
which focuses primarily on digital sound recordings and devices that
play them, the DMCA is a highly complex statute that covers subjects as
diverse as copyrights for boat hull designs"0 and safe harbors for Internet
service providers. 2 Of the five titles that make up the DMCA, this
Comment will address only the provisions in Title I dealing with the cir-
cumvention of copyright management systems. These anticircumvention
provisions allow copyright owners a cause of action against individuals
who either circumvent the technological measures that protect their
copyrighted works"0 3 or provide the technological means for others to do
so." The DMCA creates three essential prohibitions against circum-
venting copyright protection systems."
The first prohibition of the DMCA states that "[n]o person shall
circumvent a technological protection measure that effectively controls
access to a work protected under this title.' 0. 6 Because this broad
98. IR at 1079.
99. Id. For an example of this paradigm of personal use, see Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 (1984) (holding that consumers who "time-shifted" when they watched
television programs by using their VCRs to record them for later enjoyment did not engage in
copyright infringement).
100. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified, in relevant part, at 17 U.S.C. § 1201
(Supp. IV 1999)).
101. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1332 (Supp. IV 1999).
102. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (Supp. IV 1999) (containing safe harbor that limits liability for online
service providers if they take certain precautions).
103. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1999).
104. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b)(1) (Supp. IV 1999); see also, e.g., Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Reimerdes, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1780 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2000) (applying § 1201(a)(2) to web sites
that posted software that enabled users to decrypt copy-protection code on DVDs); RealNetworks,
Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. 2:99CV02070, 2000 WL 127311 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000)
(interpreting § 1201(a)(2) and § 1201(b)(1) in context of software application that circumvented
copying controls in streaming media player).
105. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)-(2), (b)(1).
106. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
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proscription is not limited to those who intend to infringe a copyright,
several accompanying provisions mitigate the potential for harsh results.
First, the provision does not become effective until two years after the
enactment of the DMCA. 10 7 Second, the statute provides an exemption
for those "adversely affected by virtue of such prohibition in their ability
to make noninfringing uses of that particular class of works."' 8 Finally,
the statute requires that the Librarian of Congress evaluate the
prohibition during the two-year moratorium and during each succeeding
three-year period to make rules allowing additional exemptions. 9
The second DMCA prohibition also seeks to prevent unauthorized
access to protected works. It states that "[n]o person shall manufacture,
import, offer to the public, or otherwise traffic in any technology,
product, service, device, component, or part thereof," that is designed,
marketed, or whose only commercial significance is "to circumvent a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected under this title.""' Thus, the distinction between the first and
second prohibitions is that while the first prohibits acts of circumvention,
the second prohibits technologies designed to circumvent systems that
prevent unauthorized access to protected works.
While similar to the second prohibition in its focus on technology, the
third prohibition of the DMCA differs from the first two in that it seeks
to protect copyright holders' statutory rights to their works under the
1976 Copyright Act as opposed to preventing unauthorized access to
their works. More specifically, the DMCA prohibits technologies
designed, marketed, or whose only commercial significance is "to
circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure that
effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title.""' The
distinction between the second and third prohibitions is that the copyright
holders' rights protected under the latter are subject to the limitations of
107. The effective date of the DMCA was October 28, 1998, making § 1201(a)(1)(A) effective
October 28, 2000. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
108. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B). Such adversely affected users might include schools, libraries,
journalists, or individuals who frequently make fair use of copyrighted works. See supra note 20.
109. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (enumerating factors for Librarian of Congress to consider in
rulemaking proceedings, such as availability of copyrighted works; impact of prohibition on news
reporting, teaching, and research; value of copyrighted works; and other factors deemed
appropriate).
110. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2).
111. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1999).
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the 1976 Copyright Act"2 while the protections against unauthorized
access are not."
3
Lastly, separate provisions in the DMCA exempt certain activities or
groups from liability under the anticircumvention provisions."' For
example, some exemptions are available for libraries and schools, law
enforcement and government agencies, reverse engineering, encryption
research, protecting personal privacy, and security testing."5
IV. REGULATING DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES CAN OVERCOME
THE DEFICIENCIES OF THE TRADITIONAL METHOD OF
REGULATING USES
In the copyright context, Congress has enacted statutes that directly
regulate developers, manufacturers, and distributors of technology only
when the traditional approach of regulating uses of copyrighted works
appears ineffective at achieving the balance between users and owners
that copyright law seeks to maintain."6 The advent of digital technology
and the piracy concerns that accompany it"' have created such a
situation."' In the digital context, regulating technology has the
advantage of preventing piracy before it can occur by mitigating or
eliminating the means used to facilitate it. Regulating technology also
allows copyright owners to bring suit against less dispersed and more
easily identifiable targets such as the manufacturers and distributors of
technologies that promote piracy. Thus, statutes that regulate technology
provide a solution to the problems that digital technology creates for the
traditional method of protecting copyrights.
112. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
113. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the "Digital Millennium," 23 Colum.-VLA
U. & Arts 137, 152 (1999) (describing purpose of 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1)).
114. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d)-(j) (Supp. IV 1999).
115. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d)-U).
116. An example of such legislation is the prohibition against satellite television descramblers in
the Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988. See Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3960 (1988) (codified at
47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4) (1994)); see also H. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 24 ("Congress has historically
advanced this constitutional objective [of copyright law] by regulating the use of information-not
the devices or means by which the information is delivered or used.").
117. See supra Part I1.B-C.
118. See H. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 25 (1998) (describing digital technology as presenting
"unique threat to the rights of copyright owners").
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A. The Traditional Method of Copyright Protection Relies on Self-
Enforcement of Copyright Owners 'Exclusive Rights
Traditionally, Congress has sought to prevent copyright infringement
by giving copyright owners certain exclusive rights to their works," 9 thus
encouraging them to prevent piracy themselves by bringing suit against
individuals who infringe the owners' rights. Because this model relies on
the ability of copyright owners to bring suit to enforce their exclusive
rights, it is effective only if copyright owners can readily identify
infringers and cost-effectively bring suit against them. Identifying viable
defendants, in turn, usually depends on the degree to which the
infringement is centralized. 2 ' For example, it is far easier to discover an
infringer, sue, collect damages, and stop future infringement if a single
individual accounts for ninety percent of the infringement, than if many
unassociated individuals are infringing on a smaller scale.
The traditional method of copyright protection is better suited for
protecting works in an analog format. Because of the higher costs
associated with reproducing and distributing analog works, analog
pirating enterprises rely on economies of scale.' Enterprises that rely on
economies of scale are, by definition, larger and more centralized than
the smaller-scale piracy operations made economically feasible by digital
technology.' Thus, with analog works, small-scale infringement is less
likely and copyright owners are more likely to sue larger copyright
pirates that are easier to identify and bring to court because of their size
and centralized nature.
119. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
120. See Trotter Hardy, Copyright and "New-Use" Technologies, 23 Nova L. Rev. 657, 668
(1999) (describing difficulty in bringing suit against decentralized infringers).
121. See Eric Schlachter, The Intellectual Property Renaissance in Cyberspace: Why Copyright
Law Could Be Unimportant on the Internet, 12 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 15, 20 (1997) (describing digital
piracy as attractive because of contrast between virtually nonexistent marginal cost of pirating digital
works and much higher costs of pirating analog works).
122. Economies of scale occur when enterprises seek to overcome high fixed costs by having a
higher level of production. See Gloria J. Hurdle, Price Discrimination and Economies of Scale in
Merger Analysis, Antitrust, Spring 1991, at 17. In regard to producing analog works, expensive
machinery is necessary to print books or manufacture vinyl records, audiocassettes, videocassettes,
and other analog formats. Therefore, it is more cost-effective to use economies of scale in producing
these works.
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B. Digital Technology Poses Challenges to the Traditional Method of
Protecting Copyrights by Facilitating Decentralized Infringement
and Making Self-Enforcement Impractical
Digital technology facilitates decentralized infringement, thereby
limiting the traditional model's effectiveness at providing copyright
protection. In particular, the combination of low-cost perfect copying
with electronic distributive networks such as the Internet allows for
widespread dissemination of high-quality copies at very low overhead
costs. This not only makes it more economical to pirate digital works, but
also more profitable to do so on a smaller scale. For instance, selling a
pirated MP3 copy of the latest top-forty single on a web site can be far
more cost-effective than copying the same song onto 100 audiocassettes
and selling them at a flea market." Thus, as small-scale digital piracy
becomes more feasible, infringement activities may become less
centralized among major copyright-pirating enterprises. 24
The ease of copying and distributing digital works also encourages
unauthorized sharing of copyrighted works among private individuals.
Although courts'2' and Congress'26 have in some instances deemed
noncommercial uses of copyrighted works to be "fair uses," the
justifications for these fair use exemptions are that the commercial
market for the works was not being harmed 27 or that copyright owners
were justly compensated.'28 It is not yet clear, however, whether
noncommercial copying and distributing of copyrighted works over the
Internet will have only a minor effect on the market for copyright
123. This occurs because if one already possesses a computer and Internet connection it costs
very little to make a song available for downloading. In contrast, the costs of employing a
salesperson and purchasing the blank cassettes make the flea market piracy operation far more
expensive.
124. See Lovoi, supra note 24, at 464-66 (describing history of large-scale piracy enterprises in
China, "the world's largest pirate markee').
125. See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (holding that
noncommercial recording of copyrighted television programs represented fair use); Williams &
Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd by an equally divided court, 420
U.S. 376 (1975) (concluding that distributing photocopies of medical journals to medical researchers
was fair use because plaintiffdid not show that this practice was commercially harmful).
126. See 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (1994).
127. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 447-50 (justifying decision on grounds that "time-shifting" when
viewers could watch free television programs would not hurt market for those programs).
128. See S. Rep. No. 102-294, at 38-39 (1992) (describing need for royalty system to compensate
copyright owners for copying that would occur using digital audio recording devices).
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owners' works.'29 Nonetheless, to the extent that such activities do harm
copyright owners, the infringers' decentralized nature will make it
difficult for copyright owners to prevent these activities because even if
Congress made it easier to bring suit, identifying infringers and the costs
of collecting judgments would be prohibitive.
C. Regulating Digital Technology Is More Effective Than Regulating
Uses
In the context of digital piracy, regulating technology is far more
effective than regulating uses because technology regulation overcomes
the problem of decentralized infringement. By regulating technology,
Congress can require technology manufacturers to install systems that
restrict the extent to which a device will allow unauthorized copying or
distributing of copyrighted works. 3' If a statute limits the ability of a
device to make unauthorized copies or distributions of a work, then
Congress has removed a tool that facilitates digital piracy before it can be
used. Thus, regulating technology overcomes decentralization by attack-
ing the problem at its core: it re-centralizes the infringement.
Statutes that regulate technology can also be more easily enforced
than statutes that regulate uses of copyrighted works. Those who
manufacture, develop, or distribute devices and technology must make a
significant investment in facilities and equipment to carry on their
business. As such, they are far more readily identifiable than digital
pirates who can operate an infringing web site with little more than a
computer and an Internet connection. In addition to being identifiable,
these potential defendants are also much more likely to have sufficient
assets to satisfy a judgment than a small-time infringer. Thus, from a
129. For instance, not long after video cassette recorders became popular, the movie industry
feared that movie rentals would eliminate demand for movies in theaters. See Vincent Canby, Those
VCRs Are Causing Something Momentous, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1985, § 2, at 19. Just as the movie
industry's fears proved unfounded-theater ticket sales have actually increased over the last two
decades, see Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United
States: 1998, at 265 (118th ed. 1998)-it may turn out that fears of digital technology creating a
similar dent in sales may also prove unfounded. For two different perspectives on this issue,
compare Adam P. Segal, Comment, Dissemination of Digitized Music on the Internet: A Challenge
to the Copyright Act, 12 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 97, 99-102 (1996) (describing
problems with "lawless Internet" and potential harm to copyright owners), with Stefik & Silverman,
supra note 44, at 2 (arguing that "trusted systems" allow such fine-grained control over copyrighted
works that user and owner interests can be balanced).
130. For instance, the AHRA requires the installation of the SCMS, which limits the copying
capabilities of digital audio recording devices. See 17 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (1994); supra Part Ill.A.1.
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pragmatic perspective, regulating technology gives copyright owners a
cause of action that is more enforceable.
V. THE TECHNOLOGY REGULATIONS OF THE AHRA AND
DMCA HAVE SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCIES
Although both the AHRA and DMCA seek to overcome the problem
of decentralized infringement, each has certain shortcomings. The
AHRA has too limited a scope to address new technologies that raise the
same piracy concerns it was intended to resolve. Similarly, the
anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA are problematic because they
do not prevent piracy of copyrighted works that are available in an
unprotected format. In addition, the DMCA harms the public interest by
allowing copyright owners to increase their monopoly power over their
works through unduly restrictive copyright management systems that
cannot be legally circumvented even for legitimate purposes.
A. The Limited Scope of the AHRA Precludes Its Application to Many
New Technologies
While the AHRA has the virtue of being a compromise between the
interests of the recording industry, the electronics industry, and con-
sumers,"' it resolves copyright issues only within the narrow context of
the technologies it was designed to regulate: digital audio recording
devices.' Even the term "digital audio recording device" has a much
narrower definition than simply a device that records digital sounds.'
Therefore, to the extent that the AHRA is a successful law, such success
is confined to the narrow context it addresses.
Three sources contribute to the limited scope of the AHRA: its
statutory language, legislative history, and the cases interpreting it.
Because the AHRA's SCMS and royalty requirements apply primarily to
"digital audio recording devices," the definition of this phrase
circumscribes the coverage of the AHRA.' The AHRA limits digital
131. SeeS.Rep.No. 102-294,at40-41.
132. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001(3), 1002-1003 (1994); supra Part JIl.A.2.
133. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
134. It is important to note that, in addition to "digital audio recording devices," § 1002 is also
applicable to "digital audio interface devices," and § 1003 is applicable to "digital audio recording
mediums." 17 U.S.C. §§ 1002(a), 1003(a). However, as each of these terms is closely intertwined
with digital audio recording devices, for simplicity they will not be discussed separately. See 17
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audio recording devices to only those devices distributed for individual
use and designed for the primary purpose of making "digital audio
copied recording[s]."' 35 The legislative history indicates that this
definition was intended to cover devices, such as digital audio tape
recorders, whose sole purpose was to play and record music. 3 6 However,
it also indicates that this definition would not include computers or other
devices whose recording function was not primarily used for recording
music.'37
Additionally, in Diamond, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the AHRA to
apply only to those devices designed solely to record and play digital
sound recordings but which do not need a computer (or other multi-
functioning device) to accomplish their recording function.'38 Given its
thorough analysis of the statutory language, legislative history, and
policy of the AHRA, Diamond indicates that clear limits exist regarding
the scope of this statute.'39 Importantly, Diamond shows that in
determining whether the AHRA provisions apply, courts will closely
scrutinize whether devices are themselves multipurpose or are dependent
on other multipurpose devices. After Diamond, a device that depends on
computers to obtain digital sound recordings or is similar to computers in
that it has multiple functions will probably not fall within the scope of
the AHRA.
Although the AHRA continues to have relevance for some new
technologies, 40 its limited scope does not cover the many new
technologies that combine digital music recording and computing and
raise the same piracy concerns as devices whose primary purpose is to
make digital audio copied recordings.' 4 ' Similarly problematic are
copyright subject matters not covered by the AHRA (such as audio-
U.S.C. § 1001(2) (1994) (defining "digital audio interface device"); 17 U.S.C. § 1001(4)(A) (1994)
(defining "digital audio recording medium").
135. 17 U.S.C. § 1001(3)(A)-(B) (1994).
136. See S. Rep. No. 102-294, at 47.
137. See S. Rep. No. 102-294, at 48 ("[N]either a personal computer whose recording function is
designed and marketed primarily for the recording of data and computer programs, nor a machine
whose recording function is designed and marketed for the primary purpose of copying multimedia
products would qualify as a 'digital audio recording device."').
138. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1081
(9th Cir. 1999); supra Part III.A.2.
139. See supra Part III.A.2.
140. See Lovoi, supra note 24, at 480.
141. See Diamond, 180 F.3d at 1081.
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visual works) that soon may be capable of being copied or distributed
just as easily as digital sound recordings. For example, if technology
evolves such that videos can be copied from one computer to another as
easily as music can be copied from one digital audio tape to another, the
same kind of compromise embraced by the AHRA for digital audio
recording devices may need to be reached for digital video recording
devices. In such a case, either the scope of the AHRA will need
readjusting or statutes accomplishing the same objectives as the AHRA
will need to be adopted to cover these new technologies.
B. Difficulties with Anticircumvention Provisions of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act Result Either in Underprotection or
Overprotection of Copyrights
The potential problems with the DMCA fall into two categories. On
the one hand, the DMCA fails to protect copyright holders adequately
because it narrowly defines circumvention technology and does not
protect copyrighted works already distributed without technological
protection measures. On the other hand, it may harm the public interest
by allowing copyright owners to expand their rights beyond those
protected by copyright law.
1. The Anticircumvention Provisions of the DMCA Do Not Adequately
Address Piracy Concerns
a. The Limited Scope of the DMCA Precludes Its Application to
Multipurpose Devices
Just as the AHRA applies only to devices whose primary purpose is to
make digital audio recordings, 4 2 the scope of the DMCA is limited in
that it only applies to devices whose primary purpose, commercial
significance, or marketed feature is to circumvent technological
protection measures.'43 The legislative history of the DMCA indicates
that the purpose of this limitation is to prevent the distribution of "black
boxes' " used to decode encrypted or protected works. 45 Nevertheless, it
142. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001(3), 1002-1003 (1994).
143. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b)(1) (Supp. IV 1999); supra Part IILB.
144. "Black boxes" are devices that decode encrypted information, such as satellite or cable
television descramblers. See S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 28-29 (1998).
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is much more likely that the computer-driven world of the Internet will
make multi-functioning devices like computers the primary tools for
decrypting encoded works or bypassing copyright protection measures.
Therefore, the DMCA has the same problem as the AHRA in that multi-
purpose devices may not fall under DMCA provisions even though these
devices present the same piracy concerns as those whose primary
purpose is to circumvent protection measures.
b. Regulating Digital Protection Systems Renders the DMCA Only
Partially Effective Against Piracy
While the anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA may prevent
copyright pirates from profiting from works that exist in a protected
format, these provisions do not apply to present or future works available
in an unprotected format."4 Therefore, the huge body of copyrighted
material currently available without protective formatting will fall
outside the scope of the anticircumvention provisions.'47 Even if the
copyright industry immediately begins implementing protective
measures, copyright pirates would have little difficulty in finding or
purchasing an earlier unprotected version of a work in order to have a
digital master from which to make copies. Thus, while the DMCA may
provide protection for copyrighted works available solely in a protected
format, it does not resolve the piracy concerns of copyright owners who
already have unprotected versions of their works in circulation.
2. The DMCA May Harm Public Interests by Encouraging
Overprotection of Copyrighted Works
Not only do the anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA leave
several piracy issues unresolved, they also potentially threaten the ability
of individuals to use copyrighted works in ways that "Promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts.""' The reason the DMCA may
undermine this constitutionally mandated goal is that its anticircum-
145. See S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 29 (stating that anticircumvention provisions were "drafted
carefully to target 'black boxes").
146. This occurs because a prerequisite for a DMCA anticircumvention suit is the existence of
some protective measure that has been breached. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b)(1).
147. It is significant however, that the legislative history of the DMCA does not indicate that
Congress intended for the DMCA to solve this problem.
148. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cf. 8.
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vention provisions encourage and legally preserve copyright protection
systems that give copyright owners more control over their works than
they are entitled to under copyright law.149 By encouraging copyright
owners to devise any protection system that benefits them most, the
DMCA risks tipping the balance of copyright law away from the public
interest and toward copyright owners' interests.
The public interest may be harmed by copyright management systems
(CMS) that tightly control the uses of a digital work. 5 ° While CMS may
protect the exclusive rights provided under traditional copyright law,
151
the corresponding limits on those rights'52 are not required of CMS.
153
Thus, many uses that copyright law encourages, such as taking excerpts
from works for educational purposes or sharing works through libraries,
could be completely prevented by certain CMS. The anticircumvention
provisions of the DMCA, which play an essential role in encouraging the
development of CMS, may exacerbate this problem. CMS are costly to
develop and implement and the more control and tighter security they
offer, the more expensive they are likely to be."M Given these high costs,
the incentive to develop advanced CMS would be undermined if no legal
remedy existed against individuals who could circumvent CMS or
market circumvention technologies. By creating such a legal remedy, the
DMCA encourages copyright owners to develop CMS that tightly
control use of their works.
The central problem with the DMCA is not that it encourages the
development of CMS, but rather that it provides protection for CMS that
expand copyright owners' exclusive rights beyond traditional copyright
law. CMS that restrict legitimate and illegitimate uses of a copyrighted
work can negatively affect fair use. The fair use doctrine encourages a
variety of uses that support the overall goals of copyright law, regardless
149. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A), (a)(2), (b)(2) (Supp. IV 1999).
150. See supra Part ILC.
151. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1994).
152. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-120 (1994); 17 U.S.C. § 121 (Supp. IV 1999); supra notes 19-21 and
accompanying text.
153. Although outside the scope of this Comment, some commentators have noted that in addition
to CMS, "shrink-wrap" or "click-through" contract arrangements also provide means for copyright
owners to expand their rights beyond copyright law. See Cohen, supra note 43, at 181-82. These
contracts allow copyright owners to obtain both actual and legal protection of their copyrights. To
contrast the "publicly" legislated copyright law, this phenomenon has been referred to as copyright
owners engaging in "private legislation." Id.
154. See Stefik & Silverman, supra note 44, at 4 ("[Ihe higher the security of a trusted system,
the higher its cost.").
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of whether the copyright owner has given permission to make that use of
the copyrighted work.'55 If CMS prevent a fair use, then only by
circumventing them will users be able to engage in the fair use.
Although Congress deliberately allowed for a fair use exception in the
DMCA, 56 the reality is that most individuals lack the expertise necessary
to circumvent a CMS unless they can obtain some device or technology
to assist them. Thus, the effectiveness of the statutory exemption for non-
infringing uses is substantially lessened by Congress's strict prohibitions
against the manufacture and distribution of technologies designed to
circumvent protective measures.'57 Moreover, because determining fair
uses is a highly fact-specific endeavor, it would be extremely difficult to
design a technology that would circumvent CMS only for fair use
purposes and not piracy purposes 5 ' and thus be legal under the
DMCA' 59 As a result, even though the DMCA provides an exemption
for fair use activities, the practical reality may be that fair uses of
protected works do not occur.
The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA may similarly impair
freedom of speech and the flow of information. To the extent that overly
protective CMS may prevent fair uses from occurring, the use of
copyrighted works for political commentary may also be impaired."6
Moreover, the statute's harsh civil and criminal penalties may have a
chilling effect on individuals or institutions (such as schools and
libraries) who would otherwise seek to circumvent overly protective
CMS to engage in exempted types of uses.' 6 1 Thus, the breadth of the
DMCA anticircumvention provisions threaten the public interest because
155. See supra note 20.
156. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1999).
157. See Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354, 416 (1999) (discussing importance of
anticircumvention provisions).
158. But see Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-
Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 519, 549-51 (1999)
(describing how circumvention system designed to make back-up copies would probably not run
afoul of DMCA).
159. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1999).
160. See Benkler, supra note 157, at 414-26 (describing negative effect of anticircumvention
provisions on free speech).
161. See Note, The Criminalization of Copyright Infringement in the Digital Era, 112 Harv. L.
Rev. 1705, 1721-22 (1999) (describing chilling effect of penalties for violating anticircumvention
provisions).
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they authorize and encourage the development of CMS that may prevent
uses that are otherwise encouraged under copyright law.
VI. SYNTHESIZING THE STRENGTHS OF THE AHRA AND
DMCA WOULD HELP ACHIEVE COPYRIGHT POLICY
GOALS THROUGH TECHNOLOGY REGULATION
Even though the AHRA and the DMCA do not represent perfect
solutions to the copyright issues presented by digital technology, each of
the alternative approaches by which they regulate technology has its own
merits. The relative merits of the AHRA and DMCA depend on the
extent to which they support the goals of copyright policy. To support
the constitutional mandate of promoting the "the Progress of Science and
useful Arts,"162 copyright policy seeks to maximize the use and
availability of copyrighted works by encouraging authors to produce
works by compensating them for their efforts. 63 As such, copyright
statutes are generally effective at promoting copyright policy if they
ensure compensation to authors by preventing piracy, encourage fair use
and availability of works to the public, and have lasting significance.
A. Mandatory Installation of the SCMS Makes the AHRA More
Effective at Preventing Copyright Piracy
The most critical aspect of preventing piracy is restricting the creation
and distribution of pirated versions of copyrighted works. Both the
AHRA and the DMCA seek to prevent piracy by encouraging or
requiring the use of copyright protection systems that attempt to limit
these activities. The AHRA affirmatively requires technological modifi-
cation of all digital audio recording devices through the incorporation of
the SCMS.'" The DMCA encourages copyright owners to develop
protection systems themselves by providing a cause of action against the
users and manufacturers of technologies that circumvent copyright
protection systems.6
Of the two, the AHRA approach of affirmatively requiring the
installation of copyright protection systems is more effective at
162. U.S. Const. artL, § 8, cl. 8.
163. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
164. See 17 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (1994); supra Part IILA.1.
165. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b)(1) (Supp. IV 1999); supra Part lB.
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preventing piracy. The AHRA maximizes the SCMS's effectiveness by
mandating that all digital audio recording devices possess an SCMS.Ie If
some digital audio recording devices were available without the SCMS,
then individuals who engage in noncommercial copying'67 would likely
prefer the less restrictive nature of those devices to the ones with the
SCMS. This would encourage manufacturers not to incorporate the
SCMS into some devices, thus reducing the statute's effectiveness. Even
if a powerful nonstatutory incentive existed, such as copyright owners
publishing their works in formats only usable with SCMS-compliant
devices, some manufacturers would likely fill the niche for pirated works
by producing devices without the SCMS.
Unlike the AHRA, the DMCA does not statutorily require manufac-
turers to incorporate CMS. 6 Therefore, because the types of CMS
installed depend on market demand and there is likely to be a demand for
devices without CMS or inferior CMS, some manufacturers will almost
certainly produce such devices. In sum, the likelihood that the protective
measures encouraged by the DMCA systems will be present in only
some devices makes the DMCA less effective at preventing piracy than
the mandatory installation model of the AHRA.
B. Congressional Selection of a Specific Copyright Protection System
Better Protects the Public Interest in Fair Use and Availability of
Copyrighted Works
While protecting the interests of copyright owners and preventing
copyright piracy is an important goal of copyright law, promoting the
public interest of maximizing the use and availability of copyrighted
works is also important.'69 Therefore, in evaluating the AHRA and the
DMCA, one critical issue is the extent to which the protective systems
they promote may overprotect copyright owners' interests and thereby
harm the ability of the public to engage in lawful uses of the work. With
respect to this issue, the key distinction between the AHRA and the
DMCA is that the former designates a specific system (the SCMS) to
166. See 17 U.S.C. § 1002(a); supra Part III.A.1.
167. The legislative history of the AHRA indicates that private or noncommercial copying is
widespread in the United States. See S. Rep. No. 102-294, at 34 (1992).
168. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(3) (Supp. IV 1999).
169. See Bell, supra note 43, at 587.
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receive legal protection,17 whereas under the latter, any system that
protects copyrighted works receives legal protection.'
Congressional approval of a specific protection system under the
AHRA better protects the public interest than the private sector selection
of a copyright protection system under the DMCA. One of the most
significant problems with the DMCA is that it encourages copyright
owners to create protection systems that allow such .tight control of
digital works that the systems effectively grant new rights beyond the
bounds of traditional copyright law. 72 Such an expansion could hurt the
public interest by making digital works less available or less usable. In
contrast, the AHRA does not create the possibility of such "private
legislation! '73 and allows Congress to balance public and private interests
in determining the necessary type of protection system. 7 It also
incorporates congressionally approved protection systems that are more
likely to take into account other public interest issues, such as protecting
consumer privacy 75 and not stifling technological development.'76
C. Incorporating Rulemaking Capabilities Such as Those Found in the
DMCA Can More Effectively Promote Copyright Policy by Giving
Statutes Lasting Significance
Much copyright legislation is enacted in response to new techno-
logical developments that make preceding statutes less effective or
inapplicable.' Statutes that regulate technology are particularly
susceptible to becoming outdated because the technological paradigms
they are designed to address often change rapidly and in unexpected
170. See 17 U.S.C. § 1002(c) (1994); supra Part IIH.A.l.
171. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b)(1) (Supp. IV 1999); supra Part M.B.
172. See supra Part V.B.2.
173. Cohen, supra note 43, at 181; supra note 153 and accompanying text.
174. The SMCS of the AHRA represents an example of this kind of congressional balancing
because it allows first-generation copying (beneficial to users) but limits second-generation copying
(beneficial to copyright owners). See 17 U.S.C. § 1002 (1994); supra Part EII.A.1.
175. See Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright
Management" in Cyberspace, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 981, 983-89 (1996) (describing copyright protection
systems that obtain information about users for commercial purposes).
176. See Samuelson, supra note 158, at 555-57 (describing how vagueness of DMCA
anticircumvention provisions could lead to strike suits against copyright owners that would stifle
technological innovation).
177. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,430 (1984).
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ways. 178  Thus, copyright statutes that remain relevant despite
technological change ensure that future innovation will not diminish the
effectiveness of the overall policy of maximizing the production and
availability of copyrighted works.
The forward-looking provisions of the DMCA179 address unforeseen
effects or problems that may result from the prohibition on acts to
circumvent copyright protection systems. 8 The ability to adapt quickly
to new situations is particularly important for copyright statutes that
regulate technology because the subject matter of their regulations
changes so frequently. At least in regard to acts of circumvention, 8' the
rulemaking provisions of the DMCA allow it to address both any
unforeseen negative effects it might have and the development of new
technologies that reduce its effectiveness. This level of flexibility results
from the continued post-implementation evaluation of the statute's
effectiveness by the Librarian of Congress and the Copyright Office." 2
By combining rulemaking authority with this monitoring capacity, the
Librarian of Congress can react more quickly and efficiently to resolve a
problem than if lobbyists, the media, or another group had to get the
attention of Congress to obtain an official amendment to the statute.
Thus, such flexibility is an advantage of the DMCA over the AHRA.
VI. CONCLUSION
Both the AHRA and the DMCA take new steps in addressing digital
piracy through the regulation of technology. While their approaches offer
advantages over the traditional model of expanding copyright owners'
rights, neither statute regulates technology in a way that adequately and
effectively addresses all the concerns raised by digital technology.
178. The advent of MP3s is an example of one such development that was unexpected when the
AHRA was passed. See supra Part V.A.
179. The AHRA and DMCA differ in that while the latter possesses rule-making provisions that
may accommodate technological change, the AHRA cannot be adjusted to address new problems
without formal congressional amendment. See supra Part HI.B.
180. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (Supp. IV 1999); supra Part HI.B.
181. Because these rulemaking procedures do not apply to the anticircumvention provisions that
regulate technology, the flexibility they add to the prohibition against acts of circumvention is
lacking from the prohibition on technologies of circumvention. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(E) (Supp.
IV 1999).
182. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C).
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In the case of the AHRA, computers and like technologies may soon
be the stereos of the future and allow widespread copying and
distribution of digital music recordings, yet they fall outside the
provisions of the AHRA. As such, the AHRA would benefit by having
Congress reassess the statute's proper scope and add a provision to have
some rulemaking body, such as the Register of Copyrights, monitor
technological developments and periodically redefine the AHRA's scope
as needed.
In order to resolve the piracy and public-interest concerns of the
DMCA, Congress should endorse specific copyright management
systems for different technologies and require that manufacturers of
those technologies incorporate these protective systems into their
products. This would better protect the public interest because Congress
would likely choose systems that are in line with the overall copyright
goals of availability and fair use of copyrighted works. Such a solution
would also better prevent piracy because the systems' presence in all
new products of that technology would more effectively prevent the
distribution and creation of pirated copies.
In sum, the alternative approaches of the AHRA and DMCA to
regulating digital technology present certain advantages to accom-
plishing copyright policy. If Congress takes note of the specific strengths
of each of these statutes, future attempts to regulate technology may
better achieve the policy goals of encouraging fair use and availability of
copyrighted works and protecting owners from copyright piracy.
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